Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.

We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to...

We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to...

In this paper we investigate the exclusion of types in optimal auctions. We show that multidimensional types exclusion is a general phenomenon.

In this note I prove the existence of the optimal-pay auction when signals are correlated.

We discuss the issue, raised by Mas-Colell (1991) whether the local uniqueness (relative to the L∞ topology) may be a generic property of equilibria in incomplete markets economies with a continuum of states.

We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for a multiproduct monopolist facing a market populated by consumers with budget constraints. Our main contribution is to show that, in general, when facing consumers with budget...