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We analyze a location-choice model with two vertically differentiated firms and two regions with different consumer income. We find that the high-quality producer settles in the poor region and the low-quality one in the rich region when income disparities are sufficiently high and goods are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005394816
In this paper the authors show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011141898
We analyze the effect of competition in market-accessibility enhancement among quality-differentiated firms. Firms are located in regions with different ex-ante transport costs to reach the final market. We characterize the equilibrium of the two-stage game in which firms first invest to improve...
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We study firms' incentives to transfer knowledge about production technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. In a setting where two technologies are available, a technology is characterized by its associated cost function and no single technology is strictly superior to the other. A firm has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005007360
This article analyzes the effects of trade liberalization between two asymmetric industries. Asymmetries concern consuemers' masses and labor endowments. The latter, together with human capital specificity in the production of the variants of a vertically differentiated good, determine market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008349
This article intends to apply the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and to study its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the resulting wage bargaining structure is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065296
We revisit Maxwell's (1998) analysis to show that his results are incompatible with the assumption of full market coverage. As a consequence, the effects of MQS regulation on the high-quality firm's incentive to adopt a more efficient technology cannot be assessed in this model.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494855