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In 1980 three Finnish companies established a research joint venture in order to develop semiconductors. The project was initiated when a de facto standard was on the verge of tumbling down, and it was terminated when a new standard emerged. We study the RJV in the light of the contract theory,...
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We consider a standard search model with buyers and sellers. Upon meeting the buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, but the sellers have an option not to trade immediately but wait for more agents to appear. If more buyers come, there is excess demand, and the buyers engage in auction to get...
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We study infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, where one of the players may be demented. If a player gets demented in period t after his choice of action, he is stuck to this choice for the rest of the game. So if his last choice was ``cooperate'' just before dementia struck him, then he's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537225
We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537227
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining...
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We show that in quasisupermodular games that satisfy strict single crossing property the least and greatest undominated Nash-equilibrium can be reached by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies. In the first round all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. In the successive rounds all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371508