We study infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, where one of the players may be demented. If a player gets demented in period t after his choice of action, he is stuck to this choice for the rest of the game. So if his last choice was ``cooperate'' just before dementia struck him, then he's...

We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is...

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining...

We show that in quasisupermodular games that satisfy strict single crossing property the least and greatest undominated Nash-equilibrium can be reached by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies. In the first round all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. In the successive rounds all...

In a directed search model, we allow the unemployed and the vacancies to choose whether to send or receive wage offers. This determines the market structure. There are several equilibria but a unique evolutionary stable one. Wage offers are made under incomplete information about the number of...

We consider a large market with frictions. We are in a directed search type setting, sellers are capacity constrained, post prices, and buyers contact sellers taking into account price and probability of service. We aim to endogenize the sellers' capacities. To this end we formulate a three...