El objetivo de este artículo es ligar la obra de Veblen sobre economía evolutiva con el enfoque de la recientemente desarrollada teoría de juegos evolutivos (TJE). Este es el primer paso en la incorporación de la teoría de evolución socioeconómica de Veblen en la discusión sobre la...

Why does an altruistically inclined player behave altruistically in some contexts and egoistically or spitefully in others? This article provides an economic explanation to this question. The basic argument is centered on the idea that social norms shape our preferences through a process of...

El objetivo de este artículo es ligar la obra de Veblen sobre economía evolutiva con el enfoque de la recientemente desarrollada teoría de juegos evolutivos (TJE). Este es el primer paso en la incorporación de la teoría de evolución socioeconómica de Veblen en la discusión sobre la...

How to price and hedge claims on nontraded assets are becoming increasingly important matters in option pricing theory today. The most common practice to deal with these issues is to use another similar or "closely related" asset or index which is traded, for hedging purposes. Implicitly,...

The role of whistle-blowing as a mechanism for deterring corruption has been conspicuously neglected in the economic literature. This is quite surprising given the increase in legislation aimed at preventing corruption that includes whistle-blowing clauses and the extensive literature on...

This essay provides an approach to the analysis of the link between Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary approach and evolutionary game theory (EGT). We shed some light on the potential contribution of Veblen's theory of socioeconomic evolution to the discussion on the application of EGT to social...

In this paper we use a non cooperative equilibrium selection approach as a notion of stability in link formation games. Specifically, we follow the global games approach first introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), to study the robustness of the set of Nash equilibria for a class of link...

We model dynamic mechanisms for a global commons. Countries benefit from both consumption and aggregate conservation of an open access resource. A country's relative value of consumption-to-conservation is privately observed and evolves stochastically. An optimal quota maximizes world welfare...

This paper formulates a dynamic model of global carbon consumption in the absence of an effective international agreement. Each period, countries extract carbon from the global ecosystem. A country's output depends both on its carbon usage and on the ecosystem ("stored carbon"). The desired mix...