criteria. A first result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) procurement … favoritism increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic implementation problems for a cartel of bidders … favoritism greatly simplifies matters for the cartel. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at a high cost …

criteria. A first result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) procurement … favoritism substantially facilitates collusion. It increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic …), favoritism only partially shades the cartel from the environment. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at …

Fighting collusion has long been a challenge in organizations, whilst favoritism in organizations has long been … favoritism together which seem to be irrelevant. We show that favoritism cannot benefit organizations where collusion is not a … serious concern; meanwhile favoritism is not effective in dealing with well-organized collusion; however, strategic use of …

-constrained when these firms repeatedly compete in a procurement context. We characterize and discuss the procurement agency's optimal … should be favored in future procurement. …

This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market …. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency’s optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By …

We consider competitive bidding for a business license, via an open ascending-price auction, between two symmetric …

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by … constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the …

-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the …This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric … corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may …

common bidding agent. Using a repeated cross section of prices across procurement auctions that were and were not subjected … to the investigation, we find that auction prices in the targeted auctions: (i) significantly increased as soon as the … counterfactual impact on auction prices by the removal of the common bidding agent and the demise of the buying collaboration at a …

opportunity to implement mutual shareholding. According to our results firstprice procurement is quite collusion-proof when …Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probably more easily achieved when … formation is difficult to realize. We compare experimentally different coordination mechanisms in a first-price procurement …