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Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University - 2011

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861926

Group Specific Public Goods, Orchestration of Interest Groups and Free Riding

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University - 2009

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008582235

Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - CESifo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and analyze how each group’s internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103399

On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts

Hausken, Kjell - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 504-507

production and conflict model. Six economics examples illustrate the unrealistic implications of rent seeking analysis. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594205

The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822636

Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods

Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals' cooperation preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a novel test as to whether there are "types" of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822657

Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries

Weikard, Hans-Peter; Wangler, Leo; Freytag, Andreas - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512517

An Empirical Assessment of Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties*

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2004

We analyze important forces that hamper the formation of successful self-enforcing agreements to mitigate global warming. The analysis combines two modules: a) a computable general equilibrium model that captures the feedback between the economy, environmental damages and the climate system and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808075

Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2003

We combine the newest concepts of non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808089

The Environmental Costing Model: a tool for more efficient environmental policymaking in Flanders

Eyckmans, Johan; Meynaerts, Erika; Ochelen, Sara - Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie … - 2004

The environmental costing model (Milieu-Kosten-Model or MKM in Dutch) is a tool for assessing cost-efficiency of environmental policy. The present paper describes the modelling methodology and illustrates it by presenting numerical simulations for selected multi-sector and multi-pollutant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808092

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