This paper is concerned with communication within a team of players trying to coordinate in response to information dispersed among them. The problem is nontrivial because they cannot communicate all information instantaneously but have to send longer or shorter sequences of messages, using...

I present a signalling model in which a multiproduct firm can use its reputation as a bond for quality by using a brand name for an established product when it introduces a new experience good. As out-of-equilibrium beliefs are specified, a false signal may be taken to imply that both the...

"Attempts to economize on decision-making time imply that groups of peers may delegate authority to a small committee of managers even though this means that the information and preferences of the uninvolved players are neglected. Decisions are more likely to be delegated to players with better...

In the context of an employment relationship, I present an argument suggesting that it is more efficient for the boss to own the productive assets. The idea is that a conflict between productivity and depreciation is internalized if the player deciding what an asset is used for also has residual...

We analyze a duopoly through a differential game, in which the players set prices as functions of time. Under reasonable assumptions, we find that prices first decline, then increase. The market share of the biggest firm grows initially but decreases later. It is demonstrated that a firm may...

Using financial measures of performance we investigate the sources of value creation in the U.S. brewing industry between 1969 and 1979. We find that market share gains in this industry at this time are not correlated with changes in value and that the performance of individual leading firms is...

We make two clarifying comments on a recent paper by Naylor and Tapon (Naylor, T. H., F. Tapon. 1982. The capital asset pricing model: An evaluation of its potential as a strategic planning tool. Management Sci. 28 1166-1173.). The conclusions of their paper are significantly affected by this.

We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in a search for information about the opponent's reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent's expected payoff is...