This paper compares the standard procedure of playing dictator and ultimatum games with the same games played by participants who knew the family name of their counterparts. When these names were revealed, dictators allocated a significantly larger portion of the pie.

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain.

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the...

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our "hot" treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our "cold" treatment we follow the "strategy...

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence...

Gneezy (2005) reports evidence indicating that in some settings people do not like to lie. In many other situations people do not suffer when they lie. We argue that the theory of simple guilt can accommodate these observations.

We test experimentally an explanation of over and under confidence as motivated by (perhaps unconscious) strategic concerns, and find compelling evidence supporting this hypothesis in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have...

This article examines whether social comparisons have behavioral effects on workers' performance when a firm can choose workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding...

This survey explores the contributions of behavioral economics, laboratory experiments, and field experiments to our understanding of the economics of trust, trustworthiness, and reciprocal behavior. A general summary presenting the evolution of trust and reciprocity, departing from pure...

We examine factors that may contribute to 'overconfidence' in relative ability on an intelligence test. We test experimentally for evidence of self-esteem concerns and instrumental strategic concerns. Errors in Bayesian updating are rare when the information does not involve own relative...