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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010863449
This article analyses belief updating when agents receive a signal that restricts the number of possible states of the world. We create an experiment on individual choice under uncertainty. In this experiment, the subject observes an urn, containing yellow and blue balls, whose composition is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008774509
This article analyses belief updating when agents receive a signal that restricts the number of possible states of the world. We create an experiment on individual choice under uncertainty. In this experiment, the subject observes an urn, containing yellow and blue balls, whose composition is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008792025
We propose a simple mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infracting upon productive efficiency. The mechanism employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to simultaneously exert efficient productive and efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681220
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008464837
While peer effects have been shown to affect worker's productivity when workers are paid a fixed wage, there is little evidence on their influence on quitting decisions. This paper presents results from an experiment in which participants receive a piece-rate wage to perform a real-effort task....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279313
While peer effects have been shown to affect worker's productivity when workers are paid a fixed wage, there is little evidence on their influence on quitting decisions. This paper presents results from an experiment in which participants receive a piece-rate wage to perform a real-effort task....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540683
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010543065
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225776
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318147