In a recent paper in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Croson (2000) shows that when subjects' beliefs about the contributions of others are elicited in a voluntary contributions public goods game, those subjects contribute less than do other subjects in the same game when beliefs...

"Political economics views heterogeneity of political preferences largely as a reflection of heterogeneity in valuations of known policy outcomes. Voters, however, may be uncertain about policy outcomes, in part, because of uncertainty about how the economic world actually works. Heterogeneity...

People's beliefs about how well economic theory predicts outcomes may affect policy through democratic processes. Knowing what determines those beliefs is then important. We investigate how individual attitudes and characteristics correlate with those beliefs using a classroom Double Auction...

Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players...

We use experimental methods to study how individuals solve life cycle 'precautionary savings' tasks. Some results resemble previous experimental work on dynamic optimisation tasks. Within our experiment, however, opportunities exist for subjects to learn from one another. Subjects participated...

Many economists find that classroom experiments using the Double Auction (DA) trading institution are an effective pedagogical tool in introductory economics classes. Results of such experiments reliably illustrate the concepts and descriptive relevance of the theory of competitive equilibrium...