We propose and axiomatically analyze a class of rational solutions to simple allocation problems where a policy-maker allocates an endowment <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$E$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> among <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> agents described by a characteristic vector c. We propose a class of recursive rules which mimic a decision process where the...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>

We analyze the implications of Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1950</CitationRef>) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal...</citationref>

To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies, we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency, (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility), and fairness. We show that only a uniform...

We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy,...

Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles: (i) proportionality (PRO), (ii) equal awards (EA), and (iii) equal losses (EL). However, most real life bankruptcy procedures implement only the proportionality principle. We construct a noncooperative investment game to...

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. In...