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It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010965563
There is an ongoing discussion about the relationship of power and preferences: Is power reflected in what the agents can do and what they want to do, or, alternatively, are preferences and power two separate dimensions of determining the outcome of decisionmaking? In the latter case...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027154
We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895695
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854041
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677116
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489328
This paper examines an Outside Option Game Designed to study the tension between maximizing the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of thus surplus among those who contributed to its creation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443405
Traditional game theoretic analysis often proposes the application of backward induction and subgame-perfection as models of rational behaviour in games with perfect information. However, there are many situations in which such application leads to counterinitiative results, casting doubts on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005404133
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474454
The present paper illustrates the coordination problem with a standard two-person non-cooperative gae, with yields two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one of which is Pareto dominated by the other.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474773