Despite descriptive empirical evidence on start-up numbers and survival rates of young firms, the interaction of market entry decisions and reactions of incumbent competitors is still insufficiently understood in the entrepreneurship literature. Repeated games offer a suitable theoretical...

This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori and Matsushima...

This paper studies repeated games with pure strategies and stochastic discounting under perfect information. We consider infinite repetitions of any finite normal form game possessing at least one pure Nash action profile. The period interaction realizes a shock in each period, and the...

We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually...

We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our...

This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994),...

<Para ID="Par1">This paper provides assumptions for a limit Folk theorem in stochastic games with finite horizon. In addition to the asymptotic assumptions à la Dutta (J Econ Theory 66:1–32, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1995</CitationRef>) I present an additional assumption under which the Folk theorem holds in stochastic games when the horizon is...</citationref></para>

This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find that if the game is connected, the limit feasible payoff set exists and is invariant to the initial prior about the state. Building on this invariance...

The paper introduces and discusses some of the most important conceptual ideas in game theory by exploring their implicit answer to the question: Who is a player? It will be illustrated that some of the most celebrated results in game theory rely on different notions of a player, global players...

Two agents independently choose mixed m-recall strategies that take actions in finite action spaces A <Subscript>1</Subscript> and A <Subscript>2</Subscript>. The strategies induce a random play, a <Subscript>1</Subscript>, a <Subscript>2</Subscript>, . . ., where a <Subscript> t </Subscript> assumes values in A <Subscript>1</Subscript> × A <Subscript>2</Subscript>. An M-recall observer observes the play. The goal of the agents is to make the observer...</subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript>