Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort? I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job charac- teristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that principals can use to influence agents' effort....

Empirical evidence shows that workers care about the mission of their job in addition to their wage. This suggests that employers can use the job mission to incentivize and screen their workers. I study a model in which a principal selects an agent to develop a project and influences the agent's...

We use data from a unique, nationally representative survey to investigate the relationship between job satisfaction and employment characteristics in Chile. Consistent with the dualistic models, job protection appears to be a positive determinant of job satisfaction rather than a cost to be...

In this paper, we design two laboratory experiments to analyze the causal effects of competition on step-by-step innovation. Innovations result from costly R&D investments and move technology up one step. Competition is inversely measured by the ex post rents for firms that operate at the same...

This paper suggests that institutional factors which reward social networks at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in explaining brain drain. The effects of social networks on brain drain are analyzed in a decision theory framework with asymmetric information. We distinguish...

This short paper analyses a simple extension to the model of Galor and Zeira (1993). I show that the result of club convergence holds under a much more continuous and much more realistic assumption of the education function. In order to achieve this result, the hypothesis of a fixed cost in...

This paper suggests that institutional factors which reward social net- works at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in ex- plaining brain drain. The e€ects of social networks on brain drain are analyzed in a decision theory framework with asymmetric information. We...