This work extends Lazear and Rosen's seminal paper to evaluate the performance of rank order tournaments when agents perform multiple tasks and the principal chooses, together with the prize spread, the weights assigned to each task in determining aggregate performance of each agent. All...

In 2007-2008, ARCADIS has conducted a study on behalf of the Flemish government, with as main objectives a review and a critical analysis of the existing calculations of environmental health costs in Flanders. This study covers the effects on human health of air pollution due to particulates and...

This paper presents a multitask principal-agent model to examine how environmental liability rules for individual managers within a corporate hierarchy affect, on the one hand, the incentive schemes the organization provides and, on the other hand, the choice between a functional or a...

We consider an environmental inspection agency who credibly commits to a permanent observation of ambient pollution at the property line of individual firms. In this setting, standard results in the theory of repeated games generalize to enforcement games. The inspection agency obtains partial...

We consider the enforcement of an environmental standard if the polluters can choose between two levels of noncompliance. The probabilities of inspection are determined autonomously by an inspection agency who permanently monitors ambient pollution. We show that this monitoring creates strategic...

We use a multi-task principal-agent model with moral hazard to study environmental regulation of a private agent by an EPA that can also allocate its budget to an alternative project with environmental benefits. In a first possible optimum, the EPA imposes a flat fine that exhausts the agent's...

The 'polluter pays principle' (PPP) is one of the four principles that govern the European Union's environmental policy. Although PPP justifies Pigovian taxation as a legitimate policy means to internalise externalities, there is a potential contradiction between PPP and Pigovian taxation...

We consider an environmental enforcement agency who uses the measurement of ambient pollution to guide its inspections of individual polluters. We compare two different uses of this information. In a first model, the agency uses a ``threshold strategy": if ambient pollution exceeds an endogenous...