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Roth, Alvin(born 1951)

Kojima, Fuhito - Palgrave Macmillan

Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing … so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game … study to which Roth made crucial contributions) and designed mechanisms in practice. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861117

Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010896846

Testing substitutability

Hatfield, John William; Immorlica, Nicole; Kominers, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 639-645

We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in … time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049779

Median Stable Matching for College Admissions

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: International Journal of Game Theory 34 (2006) 1, pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375712

Ties matter: improving efficiency in course allocation by introducing ties

Chen, Ning; Li, Mengling - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

courses and courses have implicit preferences for students. This formulates a many-to-many matching problem. We show the … inefficiencies of the current mechanism and propose new competing mechanisms called Pareto-improving draft and dictatorship … mechanisms, which introduce ties into students' preferences. Our mechanisms generate (group) stable and Pareto …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107943

Matching with Quorums

Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus - 2012

We study the problem of allocating workers to different projects in which each project requires having a minimum number of workers assigned to it or else it does not open. We show that the well-known serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy-proof nor Pareto efficient. Thus, we propose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158458

Multilateral matching

Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke - In: Journal of Economic Theory 156 (2015) C, pp. 175-206

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows … us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189755

On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

Jaramillo, Paula; Kay, Cagatay; Klijn, Flip - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2012

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may … mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market.We are interested …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010828284

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

Jaramillo, Paula; Cagatay, Kagi; Klijn, Flip - UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010763245

Course Allocation via Stable Matching

Diebold, Franz; Aziz, Haris; Bichler, Martin; Matthes, … - In: Business & Information Systems Engineering 6 (2014) 2, pp. 97-110

approaches for course allocation with a focus on appropriate stable matching mechanisms are surveyed. Two such mechanisms are … literature is complemented with results of a field experiment, which help understand the benefits of stable matching mechanisms … at the expense of strategy-proofness. In addition to these two important mechanisms, a survey of recent extensions with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848862