Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing … so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game … study to which Roth made crucial contributions) and designed mechanisms in practice. …

We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in … time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability …

set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group … stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the …

employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms … fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or …

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences over subsets of … markets like entry-level professional labor markets if the proposed matching is the workers-optimal stable matching then, no …

result persists even when a weaker stability notion is used that excludes myopic blocking. Moreover, we show that even if … not carry over. Furthermore we demonstrate that the new algorithm adopted by the National Resident Matching Program to …