Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing … so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game … study to which Roth made crucial contributions) and designed mechanisms in practice. …

We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in … time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability …

:148–156, <CitationRef CitationID="CR25">1999</CitationRef>) under the intern-optimal and hospital-optimal stable mechanisms in matching … markets. First, both mechanisms are manipulable via Type-2 pre-arrangements. Regarding the welfare consequences, they might …

approaches for course allocation with a focus on appropriate stable matching mechanisms are surveyed. Two such mechanisms are … literature is complemented with results of a field experiment, which help understand the benefits of stable matching mechanisms … at the expense of strategy-proofness. In addition to these two important mechanisms, a survey of recent extensions with …

We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems … showing that when agents' preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for …

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the …

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with … recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with …