We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement,...

This paper describes and analyzes research on the dynamics of long-term care and suggests directions for the literature to make progress. We discuss sources and causes of dynamics including inertia/state dependence (confounded by unobserved heterogeneity); match-specific effects; and costs of...

We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement,...

We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care, formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the selection of each care arrangement,...

This paper describes and analyzes research on the dynamics of long-term care and suggests directions for the literature to make progress. We discuss sources and causes of dynamics including inertia/state dependence (confounded by unobserved heterogeneity); match-speciÂ…c effects; and costs of...

We use the 1993 wave of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set to estimate a game-theoretic model of families' decisions concerning the provision of informal and formal care for elderly individuals. The outcome is the Nash equilibrium where each family member...

This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student sellers first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom...

This discussion paper resulted in the article <I>Journal of Economic Education</I> (2008), 39(4), 357-373.<P> This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages...</p></i>

This paper describes a classroom exercise that illustrates the investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student “sellers” first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom game can be used to...

Traditional discrete-choice models assume buyers are aware of all products for sale. In markets where products change rapidly, the full information assumption is untenable. I present a discrete-choice model of limited consumer information, where advertising influences the set of products from...