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Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge
Katsoulacos, Yannis; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David - School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews - 2014
In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather … of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue … conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010937850
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Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge
Katsoulacos, Yannis; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather … of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue … conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261929
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The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs
Miyagawa, Eiichi; Miyahara, Yasuyuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University - 2004
This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with respect to costly monitoring activities, just as they do with respect to stage-game actions. We consider the case where each player can observe other players' current-period actions accurately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385284
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Collusion detection in procurement auctions
Morozov, Ilya; Podkolzina, Elena - National Research University Higher School of Economics - 2013
-trust agencies for cartel disclosure in various markets. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752715
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Tacit collusion and liability rules
Friehe, Tim - In: European Journal of Law and Economics 38 (2014) 3, pp. 453-469
This paper demonstrates that the likelihood of tacit collusion in a given oligopolistic industry may depend on the kind of liability rule applied to the industry. We study typical settings for the analysis of product liability and environmental liability. For the latter, it is established that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154652
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Conscious Parallelism by Fixed Relative Prices
Erlei, Mathias - In: Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer … 222 (2002) 2, pp. 186-209
This paper is about conscious parallelism in a duopoly with differentiated products. Conscious parallelism is modelled by a "policy of fixed relative prices" (frp) i. e. starting from a competitive equilibrium both duopolists vary prices by the same percentage. This price increasing continues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633369
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Tacit Collusion. The Neglected Experimental Evidence
Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2007
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" becomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772755
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Shareholder-Value Maximization and Tacit Collusion
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1998
This paper shows that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, some dividends are distributed, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649318
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On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion
Spagnolo, G. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1999
This paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms’ ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to makes firms’ objective function strictly concave and market supergames ‘interdependent’: firms’ payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207837
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Inefficiency in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games
Cheng, Harrison - Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR), … - 2005
A widely accepted view says that Folk Theorem holds in the repeated Cournot oligopoly games with imperfect price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005132581