For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms …

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution … auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction …

We study optimal procurement in the presence of default risk. Contractors differ in the penalty they suffer in case of …

In this paper, we study bidding behavior by firms in beauty-contest auctions, i.e. auctions in which the winning bid is … the one which gets closest to some function (average) of all submitted bids. Using a dataset on public procurement beauty …-contest auctions in Italy and exploiting a change in the auction format, we show that firmsÕ observed bidding behavior departs from …

We study a model of procurement auctions in which information policies can be used to treat two heterogeneous suppliers …

We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This … development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a …