This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones....

The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory...

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the...

The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts de?ne a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory...

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-de?ned extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying ?niteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which (a) extensive forms can be de?ned and (b) all pure strategy combinations induce...

A component of Nash equilibria is potentially stable if there exists an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. Anecessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if...

Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size.Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game with noise - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed.Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy...