We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A …

This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated …) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also …

behaviour, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi and Schelling’s contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry …

) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …

) implementation with artially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …

) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …