This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auction design in symmetric equilibrium of k-price auctions, <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$k\ge 1$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, all in the setup of symmetric independent-private-value auctions. Our recommendation to organizers of auctions is to conduct...</equationsource></inlineequation>

The model of a non-Bayesian agent who faces a repeated game with incomplete informationagainst Nature is an appropriate tool for modeling general agent- environment interactions. In such a modelthe environment state (controlled by Nature) may change arbitrarily and the reward function is...

We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion...

A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players can play in the game directly without the...

We consider a single indivisible object auctioned in an ascending bid English auction. Two variations of this auction are compared with respect to the seller's revenue. In the first mechanism the participants observe the identity of a bidder that drops from the auction while in the second...

The Internet exhibits forms of interactions which are not captured by existing models in economics, artificial intelligence and game theory. New models are needed to deal with these multi-agent interactions. In this paper we present a new model--distributed games. In such a model each players...