The direct evolutionary approach according to Leininger (2003) states that players in a two player Tullock rent-seeking contest within a fi nite population behave „as if“ they were relative payoff maximizers. Accordingly contest expenditures are higher than in Nash equilibrium. The indirect...

We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm...

Agency theory emphasizes that separating ownership and control can lead to inefficiencies in corporations, but the literature on strategic delegation points out that the owner will profit from this separation due to advantages from self-commitment. In this paper, both literatures are combined....

We establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, all equilibria of a class of complete information voting games (as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)) are regular. Thus, all the equilibria of these games (including those exhibiting high turnout rates) are robust to...

The transfer problem is defined by the possibility for a donor country to end up better off after having given away some resources to another country. The simplest version of that problem can be formulated in a two consumer exchange economy with fixed total resources. Existence of a transfer...

We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.

We establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, all equilibria of a class of complete information voting games (as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)) are regular. Thus, all the equilibria of these games (including those exhibiting high turnout rates) are robust to...

We analyze a class of two-candidate voter participation games under complete information that encompasses as special cases certain public good provision games. We characterize the Nash equilibria of these games as stationary points of a non-linear programming problem, the objective function of...

We ask the question, “when should the most highly skilled salespeople sell the best products?” Our main result is that the highly skilled reps should sell better products when the task is very complex and worse products when the task is very simple. This is shown using a general analytical...