We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria – CCE – (Moulin and Vial [16]) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium – CE – (Aumann [3,4]) cannot, because these games are potential games with...

We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however...

We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash;...

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we provice that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated...

For duopoly models, we consider the notion of weak correlation using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nashcentric devices involving a sunspot structure are simple symmetric weak correlated equilibria. Any small...

We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot, because these games are potential games. We...

We consider coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) for the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that CCE can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot, because these games are potential...

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simplesymmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated...

We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is...

We consider implementation issues regarding two mechanisms that have been used to increase voter turnout in elections: fines and lotteries. We focus on the amount of the fine or lottery prize needed to achieve full participation. We then propose a combined, self-financing mechanism by which the...