a cartel. The article defends the idea that a number of these violations are debatable because they intervene although … they are not necessary in view of the aims of the sanction policy. In this matter, the main discriminations result of the …, the existence of an identical ceiling applicable to all undertakings penalized for a cartel is a source of inequality …

whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices …: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …

whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices …: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …

economic policy, because the competition ensures the freedom of choice. The theory of competition provides large number of …

cartels and preventing the creation of new ones, is at the core of open and fair pan-European markets, higher productivity and … of companies involved in cartels, focusing on the effectiveness of preventive policy of the Commission in antitrust … enforcement, reflected in particular by the evolution of the fines imposed in cartel cases. The analysis outlines how antitrust …

In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a social norm by an … to improve the understanding of Third Party punishment by reproducing an experiment conducted by Fehr et al. 2004 (TP …

punishment increased the more the norm was violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60% of the third parties punished violations of the …’’ third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that thirdparty punishment games are powerful tools for studying the …

them concerns the question of “who punishes”. In the first approach, punishment is executed by the group members themselves … individually, i.e., punishment is decentral in nature. The second approach is based on the idea that individuals may be willing to … delegate the punishment to a central, external authority. The key questions to answered are, whether individuals are willing …

for them. Almost two-thirds of the third parties indeed punish the violation of the distribution norm and their punishment … “unaffected” third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that third party punishment games are powerful tools for …

increases substantially after introducing an ex post sanctioning possibility. Namely, subjects can assign punishment points to …