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MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY
BIRÓ, PÉTER; KLIJN, FLIP - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1340008-1
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with … recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011309
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Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey
Biro, Peter; Klijn, Flip - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2011
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with … recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366301
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The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
Afacan, Mustafa - In: Economic Theory 53 (2013) 1, pp. 139-151
We study the welfare effects of different types of pre-arrangements (as identified in Sönmez in J Econ Theory 86 …:148–156, <CitationRef CitationID="CR25">1999</CitationRef>) under the intern-optimal and hospital-optimal stable mechanisms in matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993590
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Course Allocation via Stable Matching
Diebold, Franz; Aziz, Haris; Bichler, Martin; Matthes, … - In: Business & Information Systems Engineering 6 (2014) 2, pp. 97-110
Economic Sciences was awarded to Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley for their work on the theory of stable allocations. This theory was … approaches for course allocation with a focus on appropriate stable matching mechanisms are surveyed. Two such mechanisms are … literature is complemented with results of a field experiment, which help understand the benefits of stable matching mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848862
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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
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A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"
Klijn, Flip; Yazici, Ayse - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401
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Median Stable Matching for College Admission
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408
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Roth, Alvin(born 1951)
Kojima, Fuhito - Palgrave Macmillan
Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing … so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game … theory), studied real-life cases to test the relevance of the theory, conducted laboratory experiments (another field of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861117
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Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
Flanagan, Francis X. - In: Economics Letters 123 (2014) 2, pp. 113-117
In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906356
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019208