The authors examine how negotiators' risk preferences influence the formation of coalitions. Joining a coalition may either increase or mitigate risk depending on the nature of the bargaining problem. In an experimental setting, the authors test whether relative risk preferences influence the...

Important decisions are often determined by group vote. Institutional provisions may stipulate who has the authority to determine the group's agenda. According to cooperative game theory, this privilege gives the leader a great deal of power to control the outcome. In a series of experiments,...

The canonical principal-agent problem involves a risk-neutral principal who must use incentives to motivate a risk-averse agent to take a costly, unobservable action that improves the principal’s payoff. The standard solution requires an inefficient shifting of risk to the agent. This...

We use a unique data set of trust game replications to validate the commonly used “trust” question from the World Values Survey. We find that trust as measured by the World Values Survey is positively correlated with experimentally measured trust.

The Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I surely ranks among the most costly of diplomatic failures, a “peace to end all peace” (Fromkin, 1992). After he directly contributed to some of the early mistakes made by the American delegation, Walter Lippmann observed these errors...