Die vor rund zehn Jahren eingeführte W-Besoldung weist gegenüber der vorhergehenden C-Besoldung einige Vor- und Nachteile auf. Nach ökonomischen Vorüberlegungen und einer kurzen Vorstellung der beiden Besoldungssysteme werden diese Unterschiede betrachtet und Empfehlungen formuliert.

One of the main issues of the reform regarding a professor’s remuneration at German universities is the introduction of a performance-dependent salary. This paper applies relative rank order tournaments to special performance benefits at university level. It turns out that the awarding...

Over the last decade many districts have implemented performance pay incentives to reward teachers for improving student test scores. Economic theory suggests that these programs could alter teacher work effort, cooperation, and retention. Because teachers can choose to work in a performance pay...

This paper revisits a literature on the links between unionisation and performance-related pay (PRP), which offers a disparate set of results. Part of the reason for this is the usual inability to distinguish between different types of PRP and the lack of rich panel data containing such...

We conducted a field experiment in a controlled work environment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only when accompanied by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay...

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

We demonstrate that effectiveness of performance-contingent incentives is inversely related to individual risk-aversion levels through two mechanisms: 1) rational optimizing decisions about the amount of effort to supply when effort is positively correlated with risk exposure and 2) the possibly...

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...