instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders.We find that both the CEO's industry-adjusted monetary compensation …

the likelihood that the CEO will receive an incentives-based contract, perhaps because governments appoint "bureaucrats …

the likelihood that the CEO will receive an incentives-based contract, perhaps because governments appoint "bureaucrats …

of <italic>ex post</italic> contract change is also controlled for, the MNS cross-coefficient (the additional change …-time startup packages. These firms should be broken out, because the MNS theory is not about newly-hired CEOs as new CEOs could not …