We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players...

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players...

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.

We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries...

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive...

This important book, written by some of the leading scholars in the field, provides a comprehensive overview of recent advances in coalition theory and presents both the latest theoretical developments and novel applications in the field of economics.

We argue that the new approach for studying coalitions has some advantages over the classical approach: it is better at capturing externalities between coalitions and provides a micro foundation of the coalition formation process that can be related to the design of an agreement. However, we...

In a two-country model, in which countries differ with respect to the perception of environmental damages and abatement costs, the stability of international environmental agreements is analyzed in a dynamic framework. Three types of agreements are considered: A socially optimal solution, a...