Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Finus, Michael ; Rundshagen, Bianca |
Published in: |
Environmental & Resource Economics. - European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, ISSN 0924-6460. - Vol. 12.1998, 3, p. 275-306
|
Publisher: |
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists |
Subject: | instrumental choice | international environmental agreements | renegotiation-proof contracts |
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