Similar Search Results

Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions : The Case of Apex Games

Montero, M.P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in apex games under the following assumptions: first, payoff … division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition … can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions).In contrast with the results of other …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092140

Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

Newton, Jonathan; Angus, Simon D. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 172-187

This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263589

Coalitional stochastic stability

Newton, Jonathan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 842-854

This paper takes the idea of coalitional behavior – groups of people occasionally acting together to their mutual benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An equilibrium selection criterion is defined which we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577245

Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium

Xue, Licun - In: International Journal of Game Theory 29 (2000) 3, pp. 339-357

notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (2) The negotiation process is formalized by a "graph", which serves as a natural …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755721

Efficient coalition formation and stable coalition structures in a supply chain environment

Popp, Alexandru W. A. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

We study a real supply chain environment from which specific information and knowledge can be extrapolated for other similar environments. We focus our research on the analysis of the interactions between members forming different teams (and between the teams themselves), and on the leader’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008555429

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

Bossert, W.; Brams, S.J.; Kilgour, D.M. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2000

In this paper we will describe a class of three-person games and draw general conclusions about non-cooperative behavior in them.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545586

Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains

Carvajal, Andrés - Banco de la Republica de Colombia

This paper studies the falsiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavoir, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but non-trivial,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489400

Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains

Carvajal, Andrés - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2004

This paper studies the falsifiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavior, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but nontrivial,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489937

The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Bloch, Francis - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531

Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core

Vohra, Rajiv - Brown University, Department of Economics - 1997

We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While com-munication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405675