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The finagle point, the epsilon-core, and the yolk are all predictors of majority-rule decision-making in spatial voting … within the epsilon core. This article shows that the finagle radius is sandwiched in between the epsilon-core and yolk radii …. Brauninger showed that the finagle radius is never smaller than the epsilon-core radius, and claimed that the finagle point is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367613
, generically, core points exist; that is, to determine when the core exists in other than highly contrived settings. As known, the … subtle, critical error in their proofs. The sharp dimensional values along with results about the structure of the core are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556932
matching, a stable set is defined as the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with … usually defined on the core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547178
Given a capacity, the set of dominating k-additive capacities is a convex polytope called the k-additive monotone core … vertices of the n-additive monotone core and we explore the possible translations for the k-additive case. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025770
When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the ‘worst-case’ scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 — 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011003314
We generalize the traditional concept of single-peaked preference domains in two ways. First, we introduce the concept of a multiple single-peaked domain, where the set of alternatives is equipped with several underlying orderings with respect to which a preference can be single-peaked, and we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263569
In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidate's quality. Candidate quality can potentially bias the measure of ideological distance in two ways. First, voters may be more drawn to high quality candidates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005079300
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401778
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401856
When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the ‘worst-case’ scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 — 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493498