The core of a monotonic transferable utility (TU) game is shown to be the set of prices that incentivize each individual to demand the grand coalition in a market demand problem in which the goods being demanded are coalitions viewed as public goods. It is also shown that the core is the...

Selected applications of the NTU Shapley value to settings other than that of general equilibrium in perfect competition. Three models are considered: Taxation and Redistribution, Public Goods, and Fixed Prices. In each case, the value leads to significant conceptual insights which, while...

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Problems which can only be resolved through international cooperation are increasing. Due to this increase, states cooperate more than ever with each other and with international organizations (IOs) but often insufficiently to solve the problems. When social scientists analyze the potential for...