We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as...

We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as...

This dissertation extends the understanding of asymmetric group behavior in the provision of public goods. Previous studies, using an asymmetric framework, have so far focused on situations where all players profit form the social optimum. The discussion in the first paper breaks with this...

In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed "fair-share" rule of equal contributions relative to oneś endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution...

In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed "fair-share" rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution...

We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. In the experiment we observe significant over-contribution. This result is similar to those of the typical corner solution experiments. --...