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To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory price. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate pros and cons of these two formats, particularly in a setting where the authorities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245565
The authors exhibit an efficient auction (i.e., an auction that maximizes expected surplus conditional on all private and public information). In the case of private value, it is well-known that the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clark extension (for multiple goods) is efficient in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245615
This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is limited by the availability of transfers. If no transfers are possible, the private information of bidders precludes any collusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200775
This paper considers sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). The authors show that the existence of positive synergies implies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207562
The analysis is developed in the context of the "housemates problem," in which the rent for a house (the bad) must be apportioned among several housemates, each of whom is entitled to receive one room (the good). Each housemate is assumed to have the same endowment, so the auction of rooms is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264496
This paper tests two hypotheses for the overbidding behavior of the banks in the fixed rate tenders conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) from January 1999 until June 2000. One hypothesis attributes the overbidding to the expectations of a future tightening of monetary policy, while the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776181
In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776609
The equilibrium of the all-day auction when the prize is awarded by two or more people has not been characterized. In this case, I conjecture that there is no equilibrium in mixed strategies and in pure strategies if there are no caps on the bids of the contestants. I then consider an all-pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776808
this paper provides a theoretical examination of the potential costs of interstate rivalery in aquiring major sporting/cultural events and large investment projects, the ownership rights to which are held be a sole supplier.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776948
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777038