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Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
Jullien, Bruno; Salanié, Bernard; Salanié, François - In: Economic Theory 30 (2007) 1, pp. 151-169
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178692
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Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard : single-crossing and the CARA case
Jullien, Bruno; Salanié, Bernard; Salanié, François - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 30 (2007) 1, pp. 151-169
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003391236
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Screening risk averse agents under moral hazard
Jullien, Bruno - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013423689
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On competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
Pouyet, Jérôme; Salanié, Bernard; Salanié, François - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 8 (2008) 1, pp. 1-14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009522056
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Sélection adverse et aversion pour le risque
Salanié, Bernard - In: Annales d'économie et de statistique (1990), pp. 131-149
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001113045
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Equilibrium in insurance markets : an empiricist's view
Salanié, Bernard - In: The Geneva risk and insurance review 42 (2017) 1, pp. 1-14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665542
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The economics of contracts : a primer
Salanié, Bernard - 2005 - Second edition
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013482016
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Participation constraints in adverse selection models
Jullien, Bruno - In: Journal of economic theory 93 (2000) 1, pp. 1-47
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001500603
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Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
Mariotti, Thomas; Salanié, François; Attar, Andrea - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019197
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Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
Mariotti, Thomas; Salanié, François; Attar, Andrea - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 1-40
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599504