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Repeated lending with limited liability under imperfect monitoring

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Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy

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Multi-task sharecropping contracts : the Italian Mezzadria

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Do managers work harder in competitive industries?

Graziano, Clara - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 34 (1998) 3, pp. 489-498

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Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy

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Banking regulation and prompt corrective action

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Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - In: Journal of economic theory 135 (2007) 1, pp. 35-67

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Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003147725

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad (contributor); Martimort, David (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003113311

Monitoring a Common Agent

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - 2003

We study the problem of multiple financiers who want to extract income from a privately informed agent and design their financial contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between financiers has strong implications for the shapes of financial contracts....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014086681