We study an intertemporal model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal’s initial utility is...

A principal needs to make a decision. An expert is able to supply information that is helpful to the principal, but only by exerting effort, which is costly. The principal can incentivize the expert to put in effort by paying him a reward based on his reported information and on the true state...

We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no...

We define a novel information acquisition model that accounts explicitly for the influence of positive and negative anticipated emotions in the evaluation and selection incentives of decision makers (DMs). The model focuses on the value assigned by the DMs to the information being acquired and...