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Contract theory : impact on biopharmaceutical alliance structure and performance
Taneri, Niyazi; De Meyer, Arnoud - In: Manufacturing & service operations management : M & SOM 19 (2017) 3, pp. 453-471
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738564
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Universal collusion and renegotiation, dictators and contracts
Baliga, Sandeep - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000151779
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Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
Evans, Robert; Reiche, Soenje - In: Journal of economic theory 157 (2015), pp. 1159-1187
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525452
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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - In: Review of economic design : RED 19 (2015) 3, pp. 173-209
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409065
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Contract, renegotiation, and holdup : an optimal contract when interim renegotiation is possible
Göller, Daniel - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 175 (2019) 4, pp. 736-764
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168524
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Renegotiation in public-private partnerships : an incentive mechanism approach
Russo, Julio Cezar; Dias, Marco Antônio Guimarães; … - In: Group decision and negotiation 27 (2018) 6, pp. 949-979
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943685
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Syndicate size and the choice of covenants in debt contracts
Saavedra, Daniel - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 93 (2018) 6, pp. 301-329
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011966815
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Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian - In: Games and economic behavior 80 (2013), pp. 157-178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763934
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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013
This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351
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Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency : contracting with non-exponential discounting
Cetemen, Esat Doruk; Feng, Felix Zhiyu; Urgun, Can - In: Journal of economic theory 208 (2023), pp. 1-49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014390490