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Roy Radner and incentive theory

Maskin, Eric - In: Review of economic design : RED 6 (2001) 3/4, pp. 311-324

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001659062

Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Journal of economic theory 153 (2014), pp. 74-102

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479517

Local agency costs of political centralization

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 425-448

We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587346

The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal, II : common values

Maskin, Eric; Tirole, Jean - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000758475

Comments by Eric Maskin on "An optimal contract"

Maskin, Eric - In: Environment and development economics : essays in …, (pp. 268-269). 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010370937

The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal

Maskin, Eric - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 58 (1990) 2, pp. 379-409

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001274078

The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal

Maskin, Eric - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 60 (1992) 1, pp. 1-42

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001274080

Monopoly with incomplete information

Maskin, Eric - In: The Rand journal of economics 15 (1984) 2, pp. 171-196

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001013177

Contractual contingencies and renegotiation

Dewatripont, Mathias - In: The Rand journal of economics 26 (1995) 4, pp. 704-719

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001333866

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