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Contracting and Search with Heterogeneous Principals and Agents
Starmans, Jan - 2020
This paper incorporates a risk-neutral principal-agent model with contractual constraints into a random search model to … study the interaction between contracting and search in partial and general equilibrium. I introduce heterogeneity in … equilibrium in this context. Principals tailor contracts to agents' production technologies to incentivize agents' effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853495
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Moral Hazard and Unemployment in Competitive Equilibrium
Rey, Patrick; Stiglitz, Joseph E. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
Principal-agent models take outside options, determining participation and incentive constraints, as given. We construct a general equilibrium model where workers' reservation wages and the maximum punishment acceptable before workers quit are instead determined endogenously. We simultaneously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635663
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Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents
Starmans, Jan - In: Journal of economic theory : JET 217 (2024), pp. 1-28
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015067218
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Indenture as a self-enforced contract device : an experimental test
Kritikos, Alexander (contributor);  … - 2009
games increases over time. -- Cooperation ; experiment ; contracts ; indenture ; reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793109
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Subjective evaluation and information-efficiency in organizations
Mitusch, Kay - 2001
Subjective performance evaluation is modeled as auditing without commitment. A superior, who has to decide whether an where to audit the work done by a subordinate, takes into account all interim information he has obtained in the meantime. This invites workers to cover up and withhold...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009492273
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Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2014
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447
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Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999
evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … our experiments many contracts proposed by principals are 'incentive compatible' and most agents behave optimally given … contracts' and that (ii) given acceptance, their effort choices are to some extent driven by reciprocity. It seems that contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090
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Contracting with Opportunistic Partners : An Incomplete Contracts Approach
Casas-Arce, Pablo - 2016
contract). We use an incomplete contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of such behavior are … conditions for the optimality of incomplete contracts, a simple characterization of the second-best contract, and some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985153
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Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations
Sebald, Alexander; Walzl, Markus - 2012
) if this does not affect their payoffs. -- contracts ; subjective performance evaluations ; reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742627
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Macro-Welfare Effects of Flexible-Hour Contracts
Carreño, Jose; Uras, Burak - 2022
We develop a small open economy DSGE model to study the macro welfare effects of flexible labor contracts for an … contracts that exhibit rigidities in working-hours and wages while the flex sector offers flex contracts in both dimensions. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322479