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The structure of wage contracts in repeated agency models

Rogerson, William P. - 1982

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002709360

Intertemporal cost allocation and managerial investment incentives : a theory explaining the use of economic value added as a performance measure

Rogerson, William Paul - In: Journal of political economy 105 (1997) 4, pp. 770-795

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001225257

Institutions and development

Bates, Robert H. - In: Journal of African economies 15 (2006), pp. 10-61

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003336735

The role of reputation in a repeated agency : problem involving information transmission

Rogerson, William P. - 1982

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003664169

Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation

Rogerson, William Paul (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002184876

Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation

Rogerson, William Paul - In: The American economic review 93 (2003) 3, pp. 919-926

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001779309

Inter-temporal cost allocation and managerial investment incentives

Rogerson, William Paul - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000920054

Chapter 12 Incentive models of the defense procurement process

Rogerson, William P. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 1, (pp. 309-346). 1995

Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024419