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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800
politicians and experts in organizations. for politicians and experts in organizations. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779
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Dynamic expert incentives in teams
Wong, Tsz-Ning; Yang, Ling - In: Games and economic behavior 125 (2021), pp. 27-47
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616668
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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Deb, Rahul; Pai, Mallesh; Mitchell, Matthew F. - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012210210
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Delegation to a group
Fehrler, Sebastian; Janas, Moritz - 2021
We study the choice of a principal to either delegate a decision to a group of careerist experts, or to consult them … aggregation. On the one hand, the expected benefit from being informed is larger in case the experts are consulted individually …. Hence, the experts either acquire the same or a larger amount of information, depending on the cost of information, than in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012549435
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Delegation to a group
Fehrler, Sebastian; Janas, Moritz - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 67 (2021) 6, pp. 3714-3743
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012606973
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Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership
Liu, Ting; Ma, Ching-to Albert; Mak, Henry Y. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 152 (2018), pp. 296-313
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011986355
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 154 (2018), pp. 362-378
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011986852
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Consulting collusive experts
Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Tsumagari, Masatoshi - In: Games and economic behavior 122 (2020), pp. 290-317
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430447