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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227234
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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2012
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of … auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing emerges without risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571056
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Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2014
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
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Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2017
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973808
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Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms
Dworczak, Piotr - 2016
I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063
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Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries : conference paper
Rosar, Frank - 2013 - This version: February 5, 2013
I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340964
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Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
Carroll, Gabriel - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 2, pp. 453-488
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778664
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Consumer-optimal information design
Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2017
In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762788
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Multidimensional screening after 37 years
Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2024
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014577045
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Optimal contracts for intermediaries in online advertising
Balseiro, Santiago R.; Candogan, Ozan - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 4, pp. 878-896
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739034