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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2012
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of … auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing emerges without risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571056
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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227234
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Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2017
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973808
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Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2014
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
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Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries : conference paper
Rosar, Frank - 2013 - This version: February 5, 2013
I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340964
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Contracting with type-dependent naïveté
Foschi, Matteo - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473515
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Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
Carroll, Gabriel - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 2, pp. 453-488
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778664
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Multidimensional screening after 37 years
Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2024
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014577045
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Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification
Li, Yunan - 2017
A principal wishes to distribute an indivisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents. Both valuation and budget are an agent's private information. The principal can inspect an agent's budget through a costly verification process and punish an agent who makes a false statement. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963579
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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194
A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two‐stage scheme. First, agents report...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806402