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This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that … full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen …
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We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514
framework for corporate insolvency resolution are constantly changing to enhance the efficiency of such mechanisms. This pursuit … contrasts with the lack of specific efficiency data available to both legislators and researchers, there are no solid statistics … to investigate the phenomenon from the perspective of its efficiency, which makes it impossible in practice to …
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This paper presents an infinite-horizon, discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent's effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals. An agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals....
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We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010515808