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A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for fair division
Fujinaka, Yuji - 2008
We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003819939
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Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation
Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006
"Strategy-proofness" is one of the axioms that are most frequently used in the recent literature on social choice … his favor. The stronger requirement of "group strategy-proofness" is also often employed to obtain clear characterization … results of social choice rules. Group strategy-proofness requires that no group of agents can manipulate the outcome in their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064884
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Authority, Consensus and Governance
Chakraborty, Archishman - 2011
We look for necessary properties of shareholder-value maximizing corporate boards when shareholders face a trade-off between improving information sharing between the board and management and reducing distortions in decision-making arising out of managerial agency. We draw a distinction between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121778
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Authority, Consensus and Governance
Yilmaz, Bilge - 2020
We characterize optimal corporate boards when shareholders face a trade-off between improving information sharing between the board and management and reducing distortions in decision making arising out of managerial agency. We show that allocating authority to management is suboptimal....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012825311
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Mechanism Design with Ambiguous Communication Devices
Bose, Subir - 2011
This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea of the paper is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. We prove a revelation principle for the partial implementation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123537
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Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Hahn, Volker - 2010
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195375
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Mechanism Design with Farsighted Agents
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele - 2019
Agents are farsighted when they consider the ultimate results to which their own actions may lead to. We re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting with transfers where farsighted coalitions are regarded as fundamental behavioral units and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105813
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Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
Efthymios, Athanasiou; Valletta, Giacomo - 2020
We revisit the problem of providing a pure public good in economies involving two agents, under the assumption that preferences are quasilinear. We characterize the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanisms that are not dominated by another strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014109468
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Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Hahn, Volker - 2010
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190808
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The Hazards of Agency
Mitnick, Barry M. - 2009
The theory of agency, which has seen many recent applications in the social sciences and management literatures, is essentially a theory of failures: It seeks to understand the problems created when one party attempts to control another's behavior, given that control is costly and it often does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207256