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A note on endogenous timing with strategic delegation : unilateral externality case

Choi, Kangsik; Lu, Yuanzhu - In: Bulletin of economic research 64 (2012) 2, pp. 253-264

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009537993

Optimal organization of surrogacy contracts and underinvestment

Pramanick, Amrita; Banerjee, Swapnendu - In: Journal of quantitative economics : official journal of … 14 (2016) 2, pp. 216-236

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011639892

"Incentive conscious" agents and moral hazard

Dey, Oindrila; Banerjee, Swapnendu - In: Indian economic review : official journal of Delhi … 54 (2019) 1, pp. 149-169

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012225916

Other-regarding principal and moral hazard : the single-agent case

Banerjee, Swapnendu; Sarkar, Mainak - In: International journal of economic theory 13 (2017) 3, pp. 313-326

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011724236

Stochastic appraisal : a theory with an application to random favouritism

Dey, Oindrila; Banerjee, Swapnendu - In: Indian economic review : biannual journal of the Delhi … 51 (2016) 1/2, pp. 83-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873041

Optimal organization of surrogacy contracts and underinvestment

Pramanick, Amrita; Banerjee, Swapnendu - In: Journal of quantitative economics 14 (2016) 2, pp. 217-236

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418213

Other-Regarding Principal and Moral Hazard

Banerjee, Swapnendu; Sarkar, Mainak - 2013

Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ vis-a-vis the self-regarding case....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014155605

Incentives, status and thereafter : a critical survey

Dey, Oindrila; Banerjee, Swapnendu - In: South Asian journal of macroeconomics and public finance 11 (2022) 1, pp. 95-115

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013256599

Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal : single agent

Banerjee, Swapnendu; Chakraborty, Somenath - In: Mathematical social sciences 122 (2023), pp. 29-41

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014312337