Showing 1 - 6 of 6
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009626489
We consider a "tenure-clock problem" in which a principal may set a deadline by which she needs to evaluate an agent's ability and decides whether to promote him or not. We embed this problem in a continuous-time model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459056
In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960359
We consider an environment in which a principal hires an agent and evaluates his productivity over time in an ongoing relationship. The problem is embedded in a continuous-time model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945067
In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
We consider an environment in which a principal hires an agent and evaluates his productivity over time in an ongoing relationship. The problem is embedded in a continuoustime model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756012