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Lehmann, Erik - 2018 - Version , November 19th 2018

markets and contracts, adverse selection and moral hazard problems occur, where delegated (selected) managers could act in … aspect is about identifying the (most) relevant stakeholder(s), separating theory and practice into two different and … conflicting streams: the stakeholder value approach and the shareholder value approach. The second aspect of the concept is about …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928257

Financial Constraints, Managerial Incentives and the Scope of the Firm

Hong, Jieying - 2015

The recent seminal work of Gabaix (2011) raises a puzzling question: If centralization-putting different projects under the same roof-reduces diversification for investors, how does this situation reconcile with the seemingly contradictory fact that it also boosts a firm's borrowing capacity? To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025002

Banking Relationships, Managerial Incentives, Board Monitoring and Corporate Cash Holdings : An Emerging Market Perspective

Yu, Hai-Chin - 2020

pronounced when firms have poorly incentivized managers. We find that firms with a larger number of banking relationships are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837473

Antitakeover Provisions, Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Innovation

Chakraborty, Atreya - 2014

number of citations to patents. Thus managers who are protected from takeover market perform worse on innovation. However …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060331

Governance aches and pains : is bad governance chronic?

Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian - 2016

Institutional investors pay considerable attention to the quality of a company's governance. Unfortunately, it is difficult for outside observers to reliably gauge governance quality. Oftentimes, poor governance manifests itself only after decisions have been made and their outcomes known. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864693

From orchestra conductor to principal's agent : how internal financialization of top management has enabled external financialization of the firm

Baronian, Laurent; Pierre, Matari - In: Review of political economy 34 (2022) 1, pp. 23-44

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012873670

What Do Shareholders Do? Accounting, Ownership and the Theory of the Firm : Implications for Corporate Governance and Reporting

Biondi, Yuri - 2012

In the last three decades, corporate governance and reporting have been confronted to a drift toward shareholders' primacy and value, and the revival of old-fashioned proprietary views against entity views on the business firm. This paper develops an accounting perspective of the relationship...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104646

Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors

Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S. - 2006

The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders' supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058501

Does the firm with well-educational level of board members have good corporate governance?

Hung, Shih-Wei; Hsiao, Hsing-Chin; Wang, Jan-Chung - In: Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies … 25 (2022) 3, pp. 1-29

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013370999

Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance : empirical analysis of Japanese firms' behavior

Mizutani, Fumitoshi; Nakamura, Eri - In: Journal of management & governance 18 (2014) 1, pp. 245-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340691

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